Publications
Articles and chapters
7. Álvarez, J. F. (Forthcoming). Mnemic extension and appropriate causation. Erkenntnis. [PDF] [DOI]
While memory traces are one kind of entity, exograms come in many kinds. This speaks against the compatibility of the causal theory of memory with the extended mind hypothesis.
6. Álvarez, J. F., Dranseika, V., Michaelian, K., & McCarroll, C. J. (Forthcoming). Causally defective remembering: a study on the folk concept of memory. Philosophical Psychology. [PDF] [DOI]
Non-philosophers don't share all the intuitions that motivate the causal theory of memory.
5. Álvarez, J. F. (Forthcoming). Memory and imagination: toward discontinuist simulationism. Philosophical Psychology. [PDF] [DOI]
To genuinely remember an event is to entertain a representation of it produced by a reliable episodic memory system that prioritizes firsthand information. This supports the view that memory and imagination are different in kind.
4. Rudnicki, J., Michaelian, K., & Álvarez, J. F. (Forthcoming). Memory and imagination. In A. Sant'Anna and C. F. Craver (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of memory, Oxford University Press. [PDF] [DOI]
Continuism can be either the view that remembering is a kind of imagining or the view that both belong to some broader kind. Unless we specify which, the continuist-discontinuist debate risks becoming a catalogue of similarities and differences.
3. Álvarez, J. F. (2025). Remembering and relearning: against exclusionism. Philosophical Studies, 182(2), 403-423. [PDF] [DOI]
The incorporation of testimonial information at retrieval is compatible with genuine remembering.
I give a detailed summary in the "Imperfect Cognitions" blog here.
2. Michaelian, K., Álvarez, J. F., & Openshaw, J. (2025). Is De Brigard a simulationist? Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 6. [PDF] [DOI]
De Brigard's view of memory doesn't dissolve the causalist-simulationist debate.
1. Michaelian, K., Dranseika, V., & Álvarez, J. F. (2021). Experimental philosophy of memory. Acta Scientiarium: Human and Social Sciences, 43(3), e60875. [PDF] [DOI]
Philosophers assume they know what the folk concept of memory is, but the evidence for this is slim. Early experimental results suggest the folk concept is not what philosophers take it to be.
Reviews and comments
2. Álvarez, J. F. (2021). Review of J. Fernández, Memory: A Self-Referential Account (OUP 2019). Estudios de Filosofía, (64), 237-243. [PDF] [DOI]
1. Álvarez, J. F. (2018). Comentario sobre ‘¿Triunfará el nuevo gnosticismo?’ de J. Reichmann. Ideas y Valores, 67(166). [PDF] [DOI]
Translations
2. Sant'Anna, A. (2023). Viaje mental en el tiempo y filosofía de la memoria (translated by J. F. Álvarez). Lampião - Revista de Filosofia, 4(1), 323-352. [PDF]
1. Chudnoff, E. (2018). Argumentos de contraste fenoménico a favor de la fenomenología cognitiva" (translated by E. Cardona & J. F. Álvarez), Estudios de Filosofía, (57), 175–203. [PDF] [DOI]
Hablamos de este y otros temas sobre la conciencia y la percepción aquí.
In progress
A paper on infantile amnesia (draft available upon request).
A paper on vicarious memory (draft available upon request).
A paper on memory errors (early stages).
A paper on recalcitrant imagery (early stages).
A co-authored paper on forgetting (early stages).
A co-authored paper on empathy (early stages).