Publications

Articles

While memory traces are one kind of entity, exograms come in many kinds. This speaks against the compatibility of the causal theory of memory with the extended mind hypothesis.

Non-philosophers don't share all the intuitions that motivate the causal theory of memory.

To genuinely remember an event is to entertain a representation of it produced by a reliable episodic memory system that prioritizes firsthand information. This supports the view that memory and imagination are different in kind.

De Brigard's view of memory doesn't dissolve the causalist-simulationist debate. 

The incorporation of testimonial information at retrieval is compatible with genuine remembering.
I give a detailed summary in the "Imperfect Cognitions" blog here.
The PDF is available here. 

Philosophers assume they know what the folk concept of memory is, but the evidence for this is slim.


Chapters

Continuism can be either the view that remembering is a kind of imagining or the view that both belong to some broader kind. Unless we specify which, the continuist-discontinuist debate risks becoming a catalogue of similarities and differences.
The PDF is available here.


Reviews and comments


Translations

Hablamos de este y otros temas sobre la conciencia y la percepción aquí.


In progress

A paper on infantile amnesia (draft available upon request).

A paper on vicarious memory (draft available upon request).

A paper on memory errors (early stages).

A paper on recalcitrant imagery (early stages).

A co-authored paper on forgetting (early stages).

A co-authored paper on empathy (early stages).